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Fl\LSE REPRESENTI\TIO'~S A :D THE ';11'\STr~ , OR 
DIVERSIOI~ OF POLICE VER . , IT~L OR P-.t:[:OURCES 
SECTIO l 24 OF THE sur,E.'JARY Ol'I'E,,JCES ACT Elfll 
T.L. Sl!EAT 
While the Sum.11ary Offences Act 1981 was used to abolish many 
of the outdated provisions of its antecedent , the Police Offences 
Act 1927, it also served to usher in a few n w provisions . One of 
these is embodied in section 24 of the Act. 
Section 24. False all gation or report to Police - Every person 
i s liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a 
fin e not exceeding $1,000 who , -
(a ) Contrary to the fact and without a belief in Lhe 
truth of the statement , makes or causes to be made 
to any constable any written or verbal statemcnL 
alleging that an offence has been committed ; or 
(b ) WiLh Lhe intention of causing wasteful deployment , or of 
diverting deployment of Police personnel or resources , 
or being re6kless as to that result , -
(i) Makes a statement to any person that gives ri se Lo 
serious apprehension for his own safety or Lhe safety 
of any person or property, knowing that the statement 
is false; or 
(i i ) Behaves in a manner that is likely to give rise to 
such apprehension , knowing that such apprehension 
would be groundless . 
nv, L15RARY 
V!CTCR\A urnvrn:.TY GF WELUNGTOW 
• 
, -
-
• 
.... 
;p -~· 
- 2 -
Sectjon 24(a) is not n~~ , having been crLatcd by section 4 of the 
Police Offences Amendment. Act 1935, but subsection (.b) \:as created by 
the Summary Off0nces Act itseJf, which came into effect on February 
1st 1982 . The officiaJ Police Depc1rlm\;.nt rcsponLle to the question of 
whether or not they requested this ddditional charging option was 
predictably burecJucratic: the subject matter of inter-depart.mental 
discussions between the Police and Justice Departmcmts cannot be 
revealed without endangering future negotiations bL~tween the two 
because the key-note of any discussion of proposed legislation is 
. . . l . . . confidentiality . In fact the Official Information Bill was cited to 
me , even before its becoming law , as providiPg rcc1.soncble grounds for 
withholding information of the type I had sought. Nevertheless it is 
n ot difficult to speculate that the need for the section would not have 
come Lo the notice of the Justice Di2partment unless the .Polic<~ 
pointedly made the position clear. 
In the writer ' s opinion there is a significant discrepancy between 
t he diagnosed need and the presciibed treatment . In the course of this 
paper I i ntend to analyse the coverage of the two subsections indicating 
any overlap between them , any overlap with other and therefore aJternative 
c rimina l offences , an_d also indicating the extent Lo which civj_l 
r emedies offer alternative and possibly su}Jerior courses of action not 
on l y for members of the public who aie victims of offences under 
section 24 , but also for the police . I a l so intend , by contrasting 
t he way i n which section 24 (1.,) is drafted with the drafting of its 
foreign counterparts , to highlight t..hc g_rcat.. width of t..hat provision ' s 
coverage and to highlight the fact that the various rationales which 
mi ght be advanced to justify the sections scope arc greatly weakened 
by t he existence of more appropriate sanctjons , or e l se by the 
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inappropriateness of a surrL'"'lary offence as a sanction . Finally, bearing 
in mind that the section potentially encompasses considu:ably more than 
Lhe situations it is likely to bL needed for, I will advance a 
theoretical raLionale for its appircntly excessive wiJLh . 
ANALYSIS 
Section 2tl(a) 
To come within this provision a suspect must , without a belief 
in his statement and contrary to actua l fact, allege that an offence 
h as been committed. Not many "innocenL " people will be caught undC'r 
this subsection because people v.1110 aren ' t very s ure whether an offence 
has b een commitLed usually say so , and therefore their statement will 
not come within the category of alleging that an offence has been 
committe d. 
Examples of the type of person caught by the section are : 
someone who is trying to defraud his insurance company by 
claiming his house has been burgled; 
someone claiming his employer ' s car .h as been stolen to 
cove r the fact that he went on a j oyride a nd t otalle d it 
around a traffic Jight ; 
a pregnant girl who , frightened of being alienaLed by her 
parents , claims rape (not necessarily against a specific 
individual) . 
An acc used doesn't himself or herself have to make the statement 
to the police : it is sufficient if they cause it to b e ma de. Is the 
phrase " causes to be made " Lo be tested objective ly? Smith and Hogan 
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in their textbooks on criminal lav, cite cascs which have held that 
where a third party has intervened between the accused and the result 
alleged to have been caused by him , some element of mens rea is 
needed (knm,ledgc of the action or likely action of the third party) 
3 to establish that the accused caused that result. llm1cver the faclor 
distinguishing those cases is that the third parties were agents of 
the accused and it had to be shown that they were acting within their 
authority , expressed or im1Jlied , otherwise their principals couJ d not 
be held to have caused thei:r- actions. I think the question of whether 
a defendant caused a statement to be made or not will be tested 
objective ly , probably with a simple proviso requiring proof of a 
positive act thus contrasting "ca uses " with other epitl cts like " suffers " , 
4 
" permits" or " allo\·1s . 
What is required as a mental slate to come v1i Lhin s. 24 (a) is 
that. a defendant must , at the time of making or causing the statement 
to be made , have been without a belief in the truth of his statement. 
I intend in the next seclion to compare lhi s with the requirement 
of s . 24 (b) (i) of knowing that the statemenl is false . 
Section 24(b) 
An offence is one of specific or ulterior intent whe n the mens 
rea includes an intention to produce some further consequence beyond 
the actu s reus of the crime in question.
5 
The offence(s ) prescribed 
by s.24 (b) are of ulterior intent because to be guilty you do not 
have to achieve wasteful or diverted deployment of police personal 
or resources: it is sufficient if you intended such a result or were 
reckless in respect of it (and of course if you fulfill the other 
eleme nts of the offence ) . The other elements of the offence are the 
... 
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making of a false reprcsL:ntation, whethe:i:- by statl,ment or by conduct , 
which gives rise to a serious apprehension for the safety of any 
person or pro~erty, in circumstances where the represent.or knows 
(i) in the case of a statement, that it is false, or (ii) in the case 
of conduct , that the apprdicnsion it J s likely to gi vc rise to would 
be groun dJ ess. 
The> chief justificalion for the enactment of: s . 24 (b) is that it 
is in response to the "hoax" 6 call problem. Imugine if you \vill a 
simple telephone call to the Police claiming that someone is about 
to jump off the Auckland Harbour Bridge . In resr,onsc a patrol car 
is dispatched , but when it arrives there is no-one preparing to 
jump . This wouldn ' t necessarily arouse suspicion because the person 
might already have jumped. The Police's responsibility doesn't end 
here. There is still the problem , assuming the worst: , of finding 
the body , identifying it and notifying the next of kin. To l.>egin with 
thy will mobilise the harbour launch and a team of divers as well as 
a couple of pal.rolrnen or womc~n to search the shoreline . Who knows 
at uhat point they wil l realise that they have been hud . The waste 
of police manhours and resources not only makes the police look sheepish 
but inevitably detracts from their efficiency in other areffi, particuJ arly 
crime detection and inver;tigation which the public· undoubtedly see 
as the major police function . 
Take another situation , this time where someone deliberately 
wrecks his boat on the Wanganui river and hides out in Rotorua , knowing 
full well of the extensive police "manhunt" going on but wanting everyone , 
including his wife , to think he is dead so he can start life anew with 
his girlfriGnd in Australia. Prior to February 1st he would not have 
been guil l.y of any offence , despite the waste of po lice personnal and 
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resources in the ensui"ng search. Now such conduct would be an offence 
against s. 24 (b) (ii) the behaviour provision, just as the tc!lphone 
hoax call in the previous example would be an offence gainst s.24(b) (i) , 
it being a false statement giv:ing rise to a serious apprehension for 
the safety of som2 person and n'.a.de oi the:( intending or being reckless 
as to the proba1Jle dive1.sion of police resources . 
While these "hoaxes" may be the main motivation behind the 
subsection ' s enactment , they arc far from exhaustive in terms of its 
potential coverage. In the above <:=xamplcs the false representation 
was either directly to the police or else to the world at large but the 
representation can be made to an individual and still come within 
t he section : take for instance false threats to kill or do grievous 
bodily harm , or to destroy or damayc pro}?erty - if these are made with 
knowledge that police resources may be diverted then even jf the 
representor doesn ' t desire that result he is 1.eckless . 
Under s . 24(a), the statement if actionable would always he one 
o f fact , but as can be seen , under s . 24(b ) the statement could be one 
o f fact , opinion or intention , any of which could give rise to the 
r equisite serious apprehension . Tu.kc for example a fali;c report of a 
domestic i ncident where the represcntor a lleg s that in his opinion 
t he h usband is viole11t ( this is contrary to his knowledqe) and that 
t he h usband owns a firearm which he believes may have been used to 
threaten the woman (again contrary to his belief). As another example 
s uppose a " dangerous" criminal has escaped from Mt . Eden rison and a 
f riend of the •scapee says that in his opinion the man is goi ng to kill 
t he witness who " sent him away" . Suppose further t hat this fr i end 
actual ly knows that the prisoner is heading north , e . g. to Russe ll to 
hide on a yacht , while the witness lives in Wellington - an o f fence will 
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have been con1.rnitted w1der s. 2 11 (b) (i). 
" Makes a statement" in s. 2-1 (b) will probably take its meaning 
f 21( ) 11 "t. b l II 7 • 1 rorn s . ' 1 , any wrJ. ten or ver a staten,cnt , and it wou d be 
interesting to kno·,: whether the dicta of Franki J . in Given v . Prior 
(1979) 24 ALR 1142 at 445 \·,here he said " in an appropriate case 
statement can embrace not only words but pictures associi:1ted thercwi th" , 
would be good law in New Zealand. I mention this because it might 
be some people ' s idea of a joke to send pict_uresque as well as 
graphically descriptive hate mai J , whc'n they have no intent.ion of 
carrying out any threats . Such an action would be extremely 
disturbing to someone receiving obscene and threatening suggest.ions 
in the mail. 
To come within s . 24(b) ( i) you must know that your statement 
is false , but " knowing " has been held to include the state of mind of 
the person who suspects the truth but deliberately avoid~; fjnding out , 
shutting his 8 yes to an obvious means of knowledge or deliberatey 
rP.fraini ng from making enquiries the results of which he might not 
care to have": In other words , somc>thing akin to " reckless " knowledge 
i s sufficient . It is conceivable that someone could be in receipt of 
knowledge he suspects is false but. pass j t on as fact and that such 
i nformation could give rise to the necessary serious apprehension . 
If i t is vassed on intending police resources to be div rted , or 
r ecklessly as to that result then that raises a prima facie ea.;(' under 
s . 24 (b ) (j) _ 
It is useful to contrast this with the language in s . 24 (a ) of 
being " without a belief in the truth of his statement". It seems to 
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me to be possible to have some suspjcion that your s t..atcmen t.. m2.y not 
be true and ye1· still belit•ve t..hc1t.. it is true. More thun mere susp j cion 
would probubly b(' required under s . 24 (a) to show thdt. the person 
making the stat0m•nt was withoul a belief in its truth. 
The first conviction under s.24(b) came in the Henderson 
Districl Court.. on May 24, ] 982 . The defendant , one Neil Hine , had 
written a note say ing he was going to " end life in heartbreak" and 
10 
that hi s body would n ever he found. He had been on his way int..o 
the moW1tains when he changed his mind and he claimed in cour~ 
that he had thrown the note out of his car window and then ddv(~n off . 
The not..e howe ver was found at..t..ached to the windscreen of a car at 
Fairy r a lls and the owner alerted the police who spent some time 
searching for the defendant. As soon as h e heard.of the search Hine 
contacte d th e police . In court h e pleaded guiJty and was fined $400. 
His r eaction? " If I'd gon e through with wh a t I was inten ding to do 
• l l I wouldn ' t have had to pay t..hi s money - I ' d be a gonner now. 
Perhaps Hine had a point - if someone jntends to commit suicide but can ' t 
go through with it.. should they be pW1ished effectively for their lack 
of resolve or fort..itud e ? Thi s is the area of police di scre tion and any 
body of rules cannot foresee all the possible occurrences , so the police 
wi l l continue to make this sort. of decision (on t..hc basis ot whe ther or 
not they believe the suspects story , and whether or not they t..hj nk t..h e 
suicide attempt authentic). 
Perhaps Hine should have opted for his day in court . He was 
adamant that h e had thrown the not..c away , and if so I don ' t think he 
satisfies the necessary mens r ea . I don ' t think intention to waste 
police resources could be es tablished because it wasn ' t his purpose 
• 
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nor a known inseparable consequence of his act:. Furthermore recklc~s,·ness 
rcqui res kno·.vl. •dge of the risk that the note \·:ould be found , taken 
seriously and reported to the pol:ice and of the possibility that the 
police ,rnuld act . If you believe !line's story this risk v.ould be 
negligible and knowledge of it couldn ' t be :irnputed in the circumstances 
with Hine in such a distraught slat..e. l\t most Hine was negligent and 
this isn't sufficient under the section . 
Hine ' s guilty plea may have been based upon his hopes of a 
light r sentenc than if he were found guilty at trial, but $400 
would appear lo be setting a punitive precedent. 
Policy and the Drafting of Section 24 
There are two main policy considerations behind s.24(a) . The 
first is the need to sanction and deter efforts to wasLe policP t:ime or 
divert police r esources , and the second is the need lo punish action 
which renders innocent people liable to suspicion , accusaLion and 
possible arrest. In many situations , to add aulhentici ly to an 
allegation , a description of the " suspect " \vill be given , and anyone 
answering the description might be questioned. If the allegation 
were made against a specific person then arrest is a definite 
possibi l ity . 
Under s . 24(a) the emphasis is roughly balanced between the two 
policy considerations and this is because Lhe offence exists to 
sanction both forms of activity . However , the e1~hasis of s . 24(b) 
is much more on sanctioning intention to , or reckless attitude towards , 
wasting or diverting police personnal or rc·sources . This is because 
of the existence of other criminal offences c1nd penal lies to dc:1.. er 
activities which are primarily concerned with raising serious 
-
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apprehension in peoplQ for their own safety or the safet..y of their 
property: For tliose of such offences as arc best dealt wi t.h summarily 
there is the offence of intimidation contained in section 21(1) (a) 
of the Summary Offc•nces Act 1981: it is an offence , with intent to 
frighten or int.imidate any other person, to threaten to injure that 
other person or any member of his family, or to damage any of that 
person ' s property. For those of such o.ffenccs as are sufficient1y 
serious to be dealt with indictably there ar2 the provisions of sections 
306 and 307 of the Crimes Act 1961. The form.2r covers writ.ten or 
oral threats to kill or do grievous bodily harm , and the latter written 
. . . . 12 threats to destroy or damage property or to kill or inJure any animo.l. 
These types of behaviour however , if coupled with the necessary mens 
rea of s . 24 (b), will also be an offence there , thus leaving discretion 
in the police as to what charge or charges they lay i . e . whether they 
seek to sanction the i ntent to frighten or intimidate , o~ the int nt 
or recklessness with respect to diverting police resources , or boci1 . 
Lest I give the impression that s . 24 (b) is surplus to 1:equirements 
l et me hasti l y add that I believe it is totally justified as a 
r esponse t o the situations where the police are " hoaxed". My point 
is simply this : if there arc other offences in cxistenc which cover 
r epresentations giving rise to apprehension for t.hc'safcty of persons 
or property then why draft s.24 (b ) as it. has been drafted? Wou1c1 it. 
not have been simpler to make it an off nee to falsely represent the 
existence of a circumstance reasonably calling for police investigation 
(or in the rescue cases police action)? Later in this paper I will 
consider several possible rat.ionales for the drafting of the section 
i n its present form , including the possibility that there is a gap 
in the coverage of the two disorderly behaviour prov isions , b u t 
because these rationales do not appear to me to be suffi cient justification 
, . 
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(as I intend to shov:) , I will go on to advance a pos"ihl> lheoreticaJ . 
rationale. 
In its totality s.24 covers a µer·on who makes a false statement 
to the police or causes onL to be rnadc, all ging that an offence 
has heen com~itled and also a person who by statement or conduct 
falsely r•presenls the existence of some circumstances or the likelihood 
of some future circumstance which gives rise to a serious apprehension 
for the safety of some person o.c prop('rty . lvhat links the two 
provisions is the factor of diverting police resources and \vast.ing th(!ir 
time , or at least the possiLili ly there of , (al though the mcns reu. 
of intention or recklessness only has to be proved w1dcr s . 24 (b)) . 
For there l o be an overlap l.Jelwecn subsections (a) and (b) the offence 
alleged to have been committed must be one which also gives rise to 
a continuing apprehension for the safety of persons or property . One 
exampl e of such an overlap is a false state:menl made to someone that 
for instance their daughter has been kidnapped. On the other hand a 
false stu.temcnt that someone ' s house has been Lurgled is much less 
like l y to give rise to apprehension for the safety of any property 
it contained unless that property is of great sentimental value and 
therefore irrep l aceable - i n other circumstances the appr hension 
concerns whether the i nsurance company will pay out on the claim. 
One final consideration which follows on from the polic./ and 
drafti11g of section 24 is the question of why all of a sudden , in 1981 , 
the police took excepti on to the various forms of abuse I have tou ched 
upon , and requested that they be made into offences . As a matter of 
p u re speculation I would say U1at probably the occurrences were not 
becoming more numerous proportionately but rather .i.t was a combination 
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of fact-ors: pr ss covC:crage of people qeLting a 1,·ay with dUJJing the 
police, increasing demands for •ffectiveness efficiency and cost_ 
effectiveness , staff levels not keeping pace with a~mand , genuine 
demand that is , for police services , and p~rhaps some extraordinary 
occurrence where the police c xpected they might be abused , where 
t he i r resources and pcrsonnl.!l might be diverted and stretched to the 
l imits of their capacity ( foi: instance a controversial rugby tour -
even if police couldn ' t do anything about it then , U1ey now have an 
offence to punish certain forms of diversion and waste of their 
r esources ). 
Al ternative Measures 
Because of the degree of mphasis placed on the culpability of 
attempting to waste police time and resourc(s , the qucs _tion arises of 
whether the Police could invoke civil proceedings inst.cad of a 
c rimina l prosecution , and recover damaCJeS or cost.s ( in the cvc1!t of a 
wasteful dep l oyment.) . The Poiice Conm1issioner or U1e Attorney-
General on behalf of the Crown could bring an action if there w8re 
a substantive cause of action which couJd successfuJly be prosecuted . 
Clear l y tort is the most likely field in which to fiud a ground on 
whi ch to base an action but the types of claim the.Crown can bring 
in this r egard depend upon its legal standing: for instance they have 
n o standing to bring an action in malicious prosccuLion because they 
are not the " victim" and I doubt that they could show sufficient 
d amage or loss different in .xtent or kind from the person who has 
. 1 3 . 
the right to bring s u ch an action , or indeed that such an argument 
wo uld be ent r tained at a l l . One example of a possible cause of a c tion 
wher e there is no probl em of standing is in the developing field o f 
economic l oss consequent on a tortious act . Perhaps the greatest 
-
... 
~ -. ~ 
.. 
\fa 
-13- :s: 
problt.;m here would be estclblishing a duty of care and a bread, of the 
stand.::ird of care . It is difficull to see an orgument being accepted 
that the criminal law ir"tposcs statutory dutic•s: rat.:hcr it prescribes 
penalties fo· certain types of conduct . 
A more likely possibil.i.ty is the tort of public nuisance . For 
the Attorney-Gene ral to bring an action , widespread or indiscriminate 
14 • 
damage must be shown but there is also the primary ingredient , not 
satisfied h ere , of interference with enjoyment of land - it seems 
that even this action will be uw~uccessful be.cause of the lack of this 
i ngredient . 
Even if there were some substantive civil ground for act.:icn it 
c ould not totally replace sectio11 24 because in some cases waste 
wil l not be caused and if damages aren ' t appropriate an injunction 
certainly isn ' t . Also , if waste is not cau~;ed (and from the point 
of view of the offender this is pure chanco) , do you invoke the 
c r iminal law for these cases and not where a civil reme dy exists , 
or do you invoke the criminal la1v regardless? I11 the first case it 
i s unfair because the culpclbili ty of the act is essentially the same . 
but U1en in the second case a fj ne of say $400 to somc'one well off 
i s not U1e same deterrent as jt is to a l ow income earner , and in any 
case both wou l d prefer to avoid the crimi1Jal record stigma . 
To proceed however against those 1,ho could afford it civilly 
and against those \·Jho could not , criminally , would seem to offend 
agai nst an unwritten constitutionul principle: The rule of l aw implies 
the equal subjection of al l to the law. Al though I agree that the l mJ 
t o which some are subject may be differer!t from the law to whi ch 
th . 
1 5 . 1 i· t ld . . l 1 f l o ers an: subJect , I thin,~ v:ou ne unconscio11cl..) e or a aw 
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enforcemcnl autho:::-ity to contemplate deciding whether or not to proceed 
civilly or criminally on the same basis that a private citizen would -
the basis of ability to pay . 
If the bringing of a civil action i s either not practical or 
not politic there is still nothing to prevent a penal l y provision being 
added to section 24 which is equivalent in effect lo awo.rding damages . 
For example section 90A of the Western Australia Police Act 1892-1978 , 
which creales an offence relating to the ma}:ing of false rcpresentalions 
which reasonobly call for police investigation or inquiry , goes on to 
provide as follows: 
Section 90A (3). A court convicting a person of an offence under 
this section may , in addition to , or wilhout impo;,ing any penalty by 
way of a fine , order that person to pay the amount of any \Jilges 
attribulable to , or expenses reasonaJ)ly incurred with respect to any 
investigation , inquiry or search made , whether by a menilier of the 
Police Force or otherwise , as a result of the statement or act by 
reason of which the person is convicted . 
( 4) . An order made under subsection ( 3) -
( a ) shal l specify to whom and in what manner the amount is to be paid 
and 
(b ) may be enforced as though the amount ordered to be paid were a 
penalty imposed unde r this section. 
If it is deemed undesiraJJle that the Police should retain any 
money thus obtained we could follo,.; the example of sect.ion 62 of the 
Police Offences Act (South Australia) 1 953-75 , which again involves 
the offence of making false statements , and provides that any amount 
- 15 -
received by the comp].ainant (the Police ) as com_r:1i::nsc1tion for the 
expenses of, or incidental to , their investigation shall be paid to the 
Treasurer in aid of the general revenue oft.he Stat.P. 
Clearly the types of police service div0rted, or which might be 
diverted if a false representation is made under s. 24 (b) differ from 
t hose which would normally be deployed. for a false statement that an 
offence had been conuni tted under s . 24 (a) . As wel 1 as investigatory 
services , one must now include services of surveillance and protection , 
and services of search and rescue. Police personnel may include 
anyone from a telephonist to the anti-terrorist squad , while police 
r esources include anything from a walkie-talkie to tho Wanganui 
computer . However , were we to amend section 24 to allow for the 
payment of costs we would have t.o consider t..he likelihood in the 
search and rescue cases of army , navy and airforce resources 
16 
p l us the resources of volunteer groups and so forth , being involved 
and allow also for compensalion i.:o some of these organisations . 
• 
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FORI:IG C'ONTRAS'l'S 
United Kir,gdom 
While Ne·1 Zct1Lrnd c1doptcd 1-hat is now s.24(c1) of tl1c Surnmiry 
Offences Act 1981 in the 1935 PoJicc Offences Amendment Act , the 
British legislc1ture waited until 1967 to create anything similar. 
This was because of the existence of the common lc1w misdemec1nour 
of public mischief . In~- v . Man]ey [1933) 1 KB 529 (C . C.l\.) , it 
was held to be a public mischief to knowingly make a false alleg~tion 
that a crime had been committed , the effect of which is to cause po]ice 
officers to waste their time and to expose innocent people to tl1e 
peril of suspicion and possible accusation and arrest: 
"It is my clear view tl1at this act is one which may tend 
to a public mischief . It would be intolerable that our 
police force , already hard pressed to preserve law and order 
in a time of increasing Jawlessness , should hc1vc their 
services deflected in order to follow up charges which arc 
entirely bogus to the knowledge of those making them. In 
my view , taking the times - you must consider the times in 
which we l ive - such an act mc1y distinctly tend to the 
. . h. f 17 public misc ie ." 
. . h . 18 The main element of the offence was preJudice tote community , 
but this was never defined and became a matter of degree , a question 
of law for the judge to decide whether there was a case to go to the 
jury . The ancient common law misdemeanour of public nuisance 
requires a similar element but slightly better defined : an act 
not warranted by law or an omission to discharge a legal duty which 
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the 
· 19 
exercise or enjoyment of their rights. 
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New Zealand ' s amendment to its summary offence prov.isions 
came two yedrs later and it is e~sy to speculate on ll1e connection: 
s . 24(a ) is designed to punish people who make a]legations they know 
to be "entirely bogus ". Some Australian jurisdictions were slill 
employing common law offences in tlieir criminal law at this time, 
and t.hey placed certain limitations on public mischief one of which 
is relevant : the offence was held not to app]y to a wrongdoer trying 
to protect himself by giving false information to the police and thu 
d
. . h . . . 20 iverting t cir suspicion . Although this was never applied in other 
common l a\v jurisdictions it is evidence cf the disrepute that the 
offence was falling into for reasons I will explain . 
Twenty years after B_ . v. Manley (supra ) U1e Court of Crimjnal 
Appeal in B_. v. Newland [1953 ] 1 QB 158 , acknowledging that it was 
bound by Manley intimated its doubt whether an offence of public 
mischief existed except as part of the l aw of cLimina l conspi r acy 
(if so then one person alone cannot conunit the offence ). The court 
suggested th e creation of a specific summary offence ajmed at the 
type of conduct involved . The reasons behind these obiter djcta 
appear to be to prevent the expansion of commonlaw criminal jurisdict-
i on: an end to judge made l aw - the creation of offences is the 
b . f h 1 . 1 
21 
u siness o· t e egis ature . This was further r einforced in 
R . v. Todd [1957 ) SASR 305 where lh e judge for those same reasons 
r efused to recognise an offence of public mischief in this connection . 
It was also held tha t an investigation by police was not part of the 
"course of justice" as recognised by common law so fc1lse statements 
could not amount to a perversion of the course of justice , nor did 
such conduc t constitute a cheat or fraud punishable at common law . 
- ] 8 -
In 1965 the Criminal Law Revision Committee (U.K.)
22 
recommended and drafted the summary of fen e suggested in New] .:rnd. 
Their rut ion ale v1as that any conduct coming within the section 
would be akin to obstructing tl1e police in their l.<lsk of investigating 
crime and since they were altering the lmvs on obstruction this wus 
an oppo1.tune time . Following upon this rec01mnenda ion came section 
5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (U.K . ) which specifies : 
Where a person causes any wasteful employment of the 
police by knowingly making to any person a fa]se report 
tending to shm·1 that an offence has been committed or to 
give rise to apprehension for the safety of any person or 
property , ... , l1e shall be liable on summary conviction l.o 
imprisonment for not more than six months or lo a fine not. 
more than two hundred pounds , or to both. 
There are substantial differences between this section and our s . 24(b): 
1 . The person must cause a wasteful employment of the police 
- if the police are sharp enough to idenU fy falsehood then 
23 
no harm has been done , at least as far as they are concerned. 
Under s . 24 (b) you do not have to achieve the results of the 
actus reus to be guilty of an offence provided the other 
elements of the offence are fulfilled. In terms of policy 
considerations is this fair to a defendant? There has been 
no diversion of pcl j cc resources , no suspicion cast. upon 
innocent people , therefore in terms of the common law , no 
prejudice to the commurii ty at ·1arge . If someone has been 
frightened or intimidated by false threats U1e11 s . 25(b) is not 
likely to be the most appropriate sanction . Because waste 
must be caused British police will be required to measure 
waste , and because police deployment procedure is not a mal.ter 
"' 
.... 
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for public scrutiny it will be diffjcult to challenge 
if they est.im .. 1tc v1ciste in manhours or dollars . Exe pting 
whut accrues to overt.im2 hours the reill wu.st.e is opportunity 
cost - lost opportunity in crime detection or investigation. 
There is no consister t rculisb c bdsis for ea] culation of th.i s 
however and an estimnte of wu.ste can only notionally take this 
into account . One can speculate that below some level of w...iste 
the bringing of c1n action would be trivial and vexatious and 
under s.S(4) the leave of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
is required to prosecute. In New Zealand we hnve no central 
independent prosecuting auU ority but the leuve of , for instance 
som0on0 of higher rank thun a sergeant could be required . 
2. There is no provision for diverted deployment in the Britisl1 
3 . 
section: il diversion of police resources to a situation where 
they are not needed is a wc1ste , and a diversion toil situation 
wher e they are needed meuns that the element of knO\ving that t:he 
statemc,n t is false or that the apprehension is groundless , is not 
fulfilled. The use of the phrase diverted deployment appears 
to me largely if not wholly superfluous . If the police are diverted , 
by a knowingly made false representation , to a situation where they 
are needed for some olhec reaso11 , the~ the intention or reckless-
ness with respect to wu.ste is still there. 
As under s . 24(u ), the British section does not require intention 
or recklessness but this is only a minor difference because of t:he 
ease of establishing at leu.st recklessness - knowledge of an 
unjustifi able risk which the accused deliberc1tely runs . Even 
though th<? accused may consciously have wanted the police to be 
uninvolved and uninformed he can be guilty if he knowingly runs 
the risk . 
- 20 -
4 . l\ lesser dc."")ree of apprel1ension will suffice under t.he 
British sect.ion th,::m under s. 24 (b) : apprehension as opposed 
5 . 
to serious apprehension. This is highly subject.ive and may 
not amount to a relevant differe:nce because if an apprehension 
is sufficient to make someone ~all the police then that will be 
sufficient under both statutory provisions . 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended a maximum 
penalty of sjx months imprisonment in order to give a defendc1nt 
the right to select trial by jury. Under s . 21 here is no right 
to select trial by jury . Under s . 24 there is no rigl1t to select 
trial by jury because under sect.ion GG of U1e SummCtry Proceedings 
net 1957 that right is reserved on]y for offences with maximum 
penalties of more t.han t.hree months . It seems to me t.hc1t since 
guilt is dependent upon the accused ' s knowled<Je and not in most 
cases his intent. , the offence is a fit one t.o be tried by jury 
i nstead of precluding a defendant from Lhis option . 
6. Perhaps the major difference between the two sections in t.erms of 
coverage is that the British section has no ful l equivaJenL to 
s . 24 (b ) (ii ) the behaviour provision . Only such behaviour as 
amount s to a report can be proceeded wit.h , for example letting of 
an emergency flare , but a great deal of conduct does not constitute 
a report but does constitut.e an offence under s.24 (b ) (ii ), for 
example most false threats made by conduct . Since however we have 
other offences which can cover t.hjs type of behaviour (as do the 
Briti sh ), the same question keeps coming up . What i s the reason 
for this apparently unnecessarily wide drafting . 
-
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Australia 
Across the Tasman there are scvcr~l relevant provisions , 
all at the State level but they have such a degree of similcJrity 
tl1at one will be r0prcscntative of them : the Queensland VL1grc11,t~ , 
Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931-71 contains the following : 
Section 34A(l) Any person who 
(a) By his conduct; or 
(b ) By his statements (whether written or oral); or 
(c) By both his conduct and his statements (whether 
written or oral), 
falsely and with knowledge of the falsity represents 
that any act has been done or that any circumstances have 
occurred , Hhich act or circumstance as so represented 
is or arc sue], as rcc1sonably call for investig..ition by the 
police , shall be guiJty of an offence . 
All of the Australian st..itc provisions relevant to this type of 
conduct are similar to New ZeaJand ' s s.24(b) ih that they do not 
r equire any waste of police time . However , equaJly noticcabJe 
i s the fact that they on] y cover fal sc rc>prcsentations w.i U1 respect 
t o past occurrences or existing circumstances , and not circ:umslanccs 
which may come into existence in tl1e future and which give rise 
i n tl1e present to a serious apprehension for U1e future safety 
of persons or property . As wi t.:h my comparison ,.,,i th the I3ri tish 
equivalent ·t o s . 24 I find myself asking wl1at is the reason for 
t he width given in the New Zealand section? 
RATIONALES 
Di _sorder 1 y I3ehav iour 
I have alread} indicat d that threatening conduct would probably 
be dealt with as such but what of coriduct which raises apprehension yet 
falls short of a threat outright? If that conduct occurs in or within 
• 
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view of a publ j c place tl1cn it wi 11 proba bly be covered by section 
3 of the Summa ry Offence ... Act because conduct giving rise to a 
serious apprehension for the safety of persons or propert..y is also 
probably g o ing to be riotous, offensive, insulting or disul·dcrly 
behaviour that is likely i11 the circumstances t..o cause violence against 
persons or property to sta r t or continue. 
If disorderly conduct of thi~ sort occurs on private premises not • 
all instances will be covered by section 5 of the Summary Offences 
Act - for disorderly conduct on privat..e premises to be an offence 
under that section it must involve t..hrce or more person:; Cu.eh of whom 
must have been convicted of a relevant offence (assault, threatening, 
offensive or disorderly behaviour , or possession of an offm1sive 
weapon ), within the last two years Section 24(b) (ii) could be 
u sed to cover those instances not covered by s.5 jf the mcns rea is 
satisfied (at least recklessness as to whether police are called and 
knowledge that the apprehension is groundless) . Here then js the 
chief reason this rationale fails to explain the drafting of t..he 
conduct provision in such a wide form: most people behaving in a 
disorderly fashion do not contemplate wheti1er or not the cJppr0h2nsion 
raised is groundless , nor is the ul t..erior intention of ¼"asting or 
divert..ing police resources likely t..o be in their mj_nds . In practice 
when the police are called to private prernises and no offence has yet 
been corruni ttcd but one has been apprehended , they aren ' t going to a~;k 
q u estions about the perpetrators ' intent and instead they will ask ~ --.- . 
whether tl e o~mer of the property wants such person expelled from 
their property and then they will leave with or without such person 
or persons . Police regard this as something pretty routine , part.-
icularly on a Saturday night and they are not looking for ulterior 
intention of diverting the police . Covering djsorderly behaviour 
- 23 -
doesn ' t appear to be a major ratiorio.le behind the specific way 
the behaviour provision is drafted. 
Bomb lloaxes 
Anotlier possibility behind this part of tl1e section is the bor'lb 
hoax si tuaU on. Earlier this year for instance a bomb hoax at 
Waikato Hospital resulted in an evacuation of severul wards and during 
this one critically ill patient died . Most. bomb hoaxes however ure 
• 
represented by statement, although it is possible to send an article 
by post or leave a package somrn·1here with U1e intention of inducing a 
belief that it is a bomb. Britain has its own bomb houx sect.ion 
wl1ich mukes it ar. offence to falsely represent... by words or conduct... tlwt 
a bomb is present in any location whatsoever.
24 
Since New Zealand 
h h 
. 25 . as no sue section can it be said of s.24(b) that its special drc1ft...i.ng 
is in order t.o meet the same problem? Obviously we huve far f ·wur 
instances of this sort of behaviour and if bomb hooxes were the ma:jor 
reason behind the behaviour provision t.hc,n t...here would be an al t...enw L i.vc 
as in the British bomb hoax section for a sentence on conviction on 
. d. h. h ld fl . f . bl . 
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in ictment w ic wou re ect the seriousness o some possi c instances. 
It is this factor combined with the fact that New Zealand is noc. 
confronted with a major bomb hoax problem and the fact that most 
representations will be made by statement that leads me to conclude 
thot this theory is not a convincing rationale behind the drafting of 
this section. 
If the behaviour sect.ion is not necessary to cover specific tl1re~ts 
to people or property (such being well covered as I have indicated by 
other offences) perhaps it in some way covers what I might refer to as a 
general threat . 
D.W UBRARY 
VICiORIA UilivtR:ITr OF WELLINGTC14 
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A Possible RationaJe 
It is only reasonable to expect the l~w lo change with the 
times, and the existing crimin<ll law has been adjusted I believe 
to take account of ch~nged methods of protest a11d demonstration . 
Increasingly we are expressing ourselves through dir et action : 
major political demonstrations , student protest , militant trade 
un ionism , and so on . The police have a responsibility to maintain 
the public order and this s cs them getting involved to prevent radical 
di ssent and civil confrontation . 
Con sider if you will a situation nol unJike th<lt pertaining 
during the 1 981 Springbok rugby tour of Nc.,w Zealirnd : t.h e declared 
inten t of protesters is to have simultaneous cou11try wide demonstrat-
ion s bordering on the edge of lh e l aw to stretch police manpower and 
r esources to breaking point , lhe real intent. is not. to confront the 
police anywhere except the game venue . Most protest tactics were 
variations of the theme - marchers would suddenly break from lho m0in 
group and head up side streets , obliging ll1e police to further divide 
their numbers. The pressure the police cire under in such circumstunces 
cannot be disregarded. 'Phere will be no way of knowing how m2111y 
officers might be needed in any one area (even the protest leaders 
cannot estimate support in advunce ) , but th e police know that while 
they may be criticised for h aving too many officers at a particular 
27 inciden t , they are cerlain to be condemned if th ey have too few . 
If section 24 (b ) ca11 be u sed against proteste r s in situations where 
apprehensions prove to be groundless. then all the element.s of the 
offence must be satisfi d . Intention to wast.e and /or divert police 
re sources has a lready been declared , but even if it had not , reckless11ess 
as to that result could easily be imputed. Tl1e statements as 
made t tl1e press about intention to stretch police resources were 
true enough so the quest.ion falls to be answered as whether or not 
the demonstrators or any one of them behaved in a manner likely to 
give rise to a serious c.1pprehension in any person (including the 
police) for their own safety or the safety of any person or property , 
knmvi.ng t.hat such apprehension would be groun.dless . 
M1at sort. of behaviour is sufficient to give rise to such 
apprehension? Is merely demonstrating enough? Not under normal 
circumstances , but demonstrat.ing coupled with the f,ct that. demon-
straters turn up wit.h crash helmets , padded cJotl1ing and defensive 
weapqns would be sufficienL . The apprehension would be reinforced 
by police answering in kind with full riot gear he] met.s , shieJ ds ,md 
l ong batons . What is the public apprehension? Undoubtedly many 
people expect a physical confrontation , disorderly behaviour and 
inciteme11t to disorder , the escalation into violence and the 
i nvolvement of innocent. and not so innocent byst.unders , perhaps 
trespass to property and criminal damage thereof . The police 
apprehension will be similar but include also incidental assaults 
occurring between their own men~ers and demonst1ators . 
Two incidents in Wellington serve as illustrations of the 
seriousness of the public ' s apprehension even before tl1ere was any 
overt conduct on the part of demonstrators specifically against the 
second test match between the All Blacks and the Springboks . 
f irst was the effort of me~ers of the Wellington City Council 
The 
t o have closed the four streets surrounding Athletic Park to all 
traffic including pedestrians from 6 p.m . Friday August 28 , 1981 
28 
to 6 p . m. Saturday August 29 1981 . Whether or not this might 
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have led to the cancell<ltion of tl1c test as a fjnancial disdster 
or whether it would have been played out for television broadcast 
is a m~tter of pure speculation . The group of councillors claimed 
U1e power to do this existed in section 342 of the Local Government 
Act 1974 but their po~cr was limited to closir1g the streets to any or 
aJl l . l 29 ve11c es. 
The second incident. related to 70 Newtown residents \·:ho sought 
an injunction in the High Court against the Rugby Union balding their 
second test match at Athletic Park . The injunction was sought on the 
grounds of public nuiscnce because the natural and pro!Jable consequences 
of th e match going ahead would it was argued be widespread and 
30 
i ndiscriminate damage to property . The Chief Justice Sir Ron al c1 
Davidson refused the injunction stating that there was no reason<1ble 
. f . . d f d ] · · 
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certainty o · imminent anger o amage to property or persona inJury . 
No t e t l1at this i sn ' t required under s . 24 (b ) : tl1e serious apprehen::;io11 
doesn ' t h ave to be of an immi nent or reasonably certain danger - evvn 
t he possibility of dcinger is enough if the apprehension is serious . 
The police apprehension was evidenced by their raids on IIART 
h eadquart ers in various parts of the country . Even though sev ral 
r a i ds p roduced nothing tlie po l ice still establish d the necessary 
grou nds for a search warrant in Auckland where they netted wooden 
shields , b0lt cut ters and offensive weapons .
32 
Much of the apprehension existing on the doy is actually a re~;ul t 
of pro t est behaviour in the past . Because of the draft i ng of 
s . 24( b ) ( i) , behaviour which gives rise in the future to a serious 
apprehension which is groundless is an offence (remember under the 
-
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Australian provisions you must represent an exist..:i ng circumstance 
but not so under s . 24 (b)). Tl1e question which ad ses is could the 
police use an ident..ifi ed pen,on ' s behaviour in a rev.ious protest 
to sc1y .in a lc1ter protest situatinn that. p_ople recognising him in an 
advancing crowd ( for example Jolm Minto , or the m,111 t-iul doon refe1-red 
. 31 . 1 I h d to as Rent-a-Demo , Tl!n Shadbolt.. ) , would like y 1ave appre en ed 
a threat. t..o their person or property or to the person or property 
of another? Even if this is a possible reading of the section it is 
undesirable that the law should punish someone tw.i.ce for one act . 
There should at least be some bcrwviour o 1 the day giving rise t..o U1e 
r equisite serious apprehension or likely tc, do so . The same 
consideration applies t..o the t..wo illustrution.s I gave of the appre-
hension existing even before the dcty of t..he second test: some conduct.. 
on the day it.self ought to be required before anyone can be found to 
have co~nit..t..ed an offence . 
In what circumstances !Td ght p1~otestcrs know that such appr.ehcr,sion 
as their behaviour docs give rise to is groundless? \\'hat if in the 
end there is ei thcr no violence at al 1, or, if it is confined tot.ally 
t o one venue , say for instance Eden Park . All around the country 
the pol.i cc wi ll have tuken wh·1t ver steps appeared necessary t o protect 
th e public , but if those s t.. CJJS prove to be unnecessary then just. as {n 
other circumstances where the> police have been called for nothing , a 
prima facie case .i s raised and the only problem is imputing knowledge 
to th e accused that the apprehension raised was groundless . This 
k row l edge might be imputed from the circumstc1nces , for instance .if 
fringe elements have undertaken to protest.. peacefully , or if they have 
all gone to protest.. in Auckland . Another circu~stance in whi c h 
• 
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protesters may know t..hat thC' apprC'hension is groundless is when 
th e indivjdual protester ' s <1clions raise .in <1pprehe1 sjon he or she 
knows is groundless , that is, wl1ere t..he knowledge is particular 
to the protester und lxi.sed upon his inlc1 lion . Obviously even if 
the upprehension raised by the whole protest.. group is not groundless 
individual protesters cnn stj]l he guilty of an offence if tl1ejr 
behaviour raises a serious apprehension whi..ch they know is groundlerJs. 
Th e official Police reply to the question whet.her the de111onslrc t-
ion situation was an intended or even a t..heoretic.il use of the 
section? ''You will appreciute t..he dangers of an officjal response 
to a hypothetica l situution . There are loo many voriables and 
interpretations on lhe hypothetical fuct si tualions to provide ,rn 
answer that would have any rc<1l meaning. " 
34 
In an "unofficial " int:erview a police spokesperson stated thnt 
the p o lj ce do not think a llendance at demonstrations , or the monitor-
ing of gang activity by shadow patrols is a waste of their time. 
The reason is one of mass psychology: wlien l arge groups gather to 
demonstrate , no matter h ow l oft:y their intentions tlie occasion is 
likely to be exploited by ot:liers witl1 i1 motive for violence aud 
disorde r. "Time after tjme lhe l ead !l"S .of demonslrations h ave 
found themse lves in the prcojcam nt of the sorceror ' s apprentice who 
35 
has unleased forces he is impotent to control " - If the protest. 
groups are disciplined and well controlled then thjs apprehension 
like the publics ' may be groundless. The police might say thut.. 
what i s important is the containment and control of unpredjctable 
fring e elements , but what rernc1ins is that an organised group has 
abused the fact that police will uh:ays respond in demonstration 
circumstances , in much the same way as the hoax cc11ler saying some -
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one was about to, jump off the Harbour Bridge ubused the fuct tlrnt lhe 
poljce ' s dut.y towards the preservation of life is u duty of 
affirmative action . It is un obvious policy of s.24 to sanction 
abuse of police functions with respect to the invesb ga.tion ,rnd 
prevention of crime , the detection and apprehension of criminals 
and with respect to the duty towards tl e prescrva tion of life. h'hy 
should it be any l ess so a mut.ter of policy to sanction the abuse of 
the police ' s duty towards the preservation of social order? (l\fler 
all a n upprehension of a dissolution of social order is an apprehended 
threa t to the safety of persons or property and necessarily calls for 
p o lice action ) . 
CONCLUSION 
I should like to say that s . 24 oft.he Surnmcny Offences Act 
1981 , in so far as it deals with false sL~1tcmc!nts 111,:-idc \·lith knowledge 
of the material f alsity , is necessary to punish pc•op]c who seek lo 
abuse th e service s the police provide , or who seek to exact v cngcd1,ce 
on th e police or on other people by the mn~ing of false allegatio1 s 
and the bringing of people into suspicion , or by inc1king faJ sc E;tat.e-
ments which give rise to serious upprehension fort.he life or safety 
of any p erson or the safety of any property. On the other hand I am 
not convinced by the rationales behind the behaviour clause wliich, 
while undoubtedly useful , has been drafted in an apparently excessively 
wide form . I can find nor ason 0hy New Zealand should deliberately 
choose not to foll ow the narro~er f6rms of the section in u se in 
Brita in or Australia or why it should cl1oose to pioneer this particular 
drafting of the section , and only time wi 11 tel 1 \·.•hcther or not there 
.rs anot.her purpose for which s . 24 (b) (ii) is intencied . 
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